Mandiant Redline: Complete Guide to Using Its Memory & Malware Analysis ToolsMandiant Redline is a free forensic tool from Mandiant (now part of Google Cloud / Mandiant) designed to help incident responders and malware analysts collect and analyze volatile and persistent artifacts from Windows endpoints. It focuses on two primary capabilities: targeted collection of forensic data (host-based triage) and interactive, investigator-driven analysis of memory and artifacts. This guide explains what Redline does, how to install and configure it, how to collect data safely, how to perform memory and malware analysis with its built‑in features, and practical workflows and tips for real-world incident response.
Overview: What Redline is and when to use it
Mandiant Redline provides:
- Host triage and forensic collection: collect volatile data (running processes, network connections, loaded drivers, registry hives, memory regions) and non-volatile artifacts (event logs, files, services) in a forensically-sound manner.
- Memory analysis: examine process memory, extract strings, search for injected code, identify suspicious modules, and detect artifacts of malware persistence or exploitation.
- Timeline and artifact correlation: correlate events from various data sources to build a timeline of compromise.
- IOC and YARA scanning: search collected data for indicators of compromise (hashes, filenames, registry keys, domains, IPs) and apply YARA rules to detect known malicious patterns.
- Interactive investigation GUI: a user-friendly interface for pivoting between processes, threads, modules, registry keys, network connections, and extracted artifacts.
Use Redline when you need a fast, host-level snapshot and analysis—especially on Windows systems—either for initial triage during an incident or for deeper analysis of suspicious memory/processes discovered during monitoring.
Installation and setup
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System requirements:
- Windows 7 or later (Windows Server variants supported).
- Administrative privileges for full data collection (some collection can run with reduced rights but will be limited).
- Enough disk space for collected evidence (memory images and extracted artifacts can be large).
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Download and installation:
- Obtain Redline from Mandiant’s official download page (ensure you download from a trusted source).
- Installer is a simple executable—run it on an analyst workstation (not the target host). Redline’s collector component (the “Collector” package) should be deployed to target machines for evidence capture.
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Configuring Redline:
- Create a case in the Redline GUI, set case metadata, and configure collection profiles (what to collect, how deep, which processes to include/exclude).
- Configure remote collection settings if collecting from multiple endpoints—Redline supports creating portable collector packages to run on target systems.
Collection best practices
- Perform collection with administrative privileges whenever possible to capture full memory and system artifacts.
- If live response is required, prefer targeted collections to minimize impact and limit data volume—collect specific process memory, relevant registry hives, service configurations, event logs, and network artifacts.
- When imaging memory, use the built-in memory collection option; ensure you have disk space and that the target system remains stable during acquisition.
- Maintain chain-of-custody and document actions: who ran the collector, on which host, time stamps, and justification for the collection.
- For incident response in sensitive environments, consider scheduling an initial triage collection (rapid, small) followed by a full collection if indicators justify deeper analysis.
Creating and running a collection
- Start a new case and add a host to the case.
- Choose a collection profile. Typical profiles:
- Quick Triage: processes, connections, loaded modules, event logs (small, fast).
- Full Memory Capture: full physical memory plus comprehensive artifacts (large, slower).
- Custom: pick specific artifacts (registry hives, files, services).
- Generate a portable collector package if you cannot run Redline’s GUI on the endpoint. This creates a self-contained collector executable to run on the target.
- Run the collector on the target. The collector will produce a Redline Collection Package (.RLP) or a folder with evidence files.
- Import the collected data into the Redline GUI on an analyst workstation for analysis.
Memory analysis: core techniques in Redline
Memory analysis is often the most valuable part of Redline. Key features and steps:
- Process listing and memory regions: Redline shows all running processes and allows you to view memory ranges, heap, stack, and mapped modules.
- Strings and searching: extract strings from process memory and search for suspicious keywords (e.g., domain names, IPs, malware function names).
- Modules and DLLs: inspect loaded modules for unsigned or anomalous DLLs, suspicious export functions, or unusual load addresses indicating injection.
- Thread and handle analysis: examine thread stacks for suspicious code or remote thread creation, and inspect handles for open files, network sockets, or synchronization objects used by malware.
- Injected code detection: look for memory regions with executable permissions that are not backed by files or that contain suspicious signatures.
- Volatile artifacts: view process command lines, arguments, environment variables, and loaded drivers.
- YARA scanning on memory: apply YARA rules to process memory to detect known signatures.
Practical memory analysis workflow:
- Identify suspicious processes (high CPU, unknown names, network activity).
- Dump process memory for deeper inspection.
- Run YARA and string searches on memory dumps.
- Inspect threads and stacks for evidence of code injection or shellcode.
- Extract and analyze suspicious PE images or scripts found in memory.
Malware artifact analysis
Beyond raw memory, Redline helps locate artifacts commonly associated with malware:
- Persistence mechanisms: check Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, services, and startup folders for suspicious entries.
- DLL search order hijacking: identify unexpected DLLs in application directories.
- Configuration and staging: search memory and files for embedded configuration, C2 addresses, encryption keys, and command strings.
- File and process hashes: compute hashes (MD5/SHA1/SHA256) of suspicious files and compare to known IOCs.
- Network indicators: list active connections and resolve domains to spot communications with C2 servers.
- Event logs and timeline: correlate timestamps in event logs, file metadata, and network events to reconstruct attacker actions.
Using YARA and IOC searches
- Redline supports searching collected artifacts with indicators of compromise (hashes, filenames, registry keys, IPs, domains).
- Import YARA rules into Redline to scan memory and files. Start with curated rules (e.g., public threat intel YARA sets) and tune them to reduce false positives.
- Use YARA to detect obfuscated loaders, packed binaries, and known malware families. Combine YARA results with process context (which process memory matched) to prioritize investigation.
Report generation and evidence export
- Redline can generate investigation reports summarizing findings, matched IOCs, suspicious processes, extracted files, and timeline snippets.
- Export extracted files (dropped binaries, suspicious DLLs, memory dumps) for deeper static or dynamic analysis in other tools (Ghidra, IDA Pro, x86/x64 debuggers, sandboxing).
- Include hash lists, YARA matches, and notable artifacts in incident reports for sharing with stakeholders or threat intel teams.
Integrations and follow-up analysis
- Use Redline results to seed higher-fidelity investigations: upload suspicious binaries to sandbox services, run static analysis, and perform network traffic correlation in SIEMs.
- Combine Redline findings with EDR telemetry when available: pivot from a process found in Redline to historical detections or alerts in your EDR console.
- Feed discovered IOCs back into detection platforms (firewalls, IDS/IPS, endpoint agents) to hunt for other affected systems.
Limitations and defensive considerations
- Redline is Windows-centric; it does not perform Linux/macOS live memory capture.
- Collection on live systems can disrupt operations; use targeted collections when possible.
- Memory collection size and analysis complexity can be large—plan storage and processing resources.
- As with any tool, Redline can produce false positives; correlate multiple artifacts (process behavior, network connections, persistence mechanisms) before concluding compromise.
- Attackers may attempt to detect forensic tools; consider stealthier collection or additional endpoint controls in adversarial environments.
Practical tips and checklist
- Always document who initiated collection, reason, and timing.
- For critical systems, perform an initial light triage, then escalate to full capture if justified.
- Keep YARA rules and IOC lists updated from trusted intel sources.
- When possible, perform analysis on an isolated analyst workstation to avoid contaminating your production environment.
- Preserve original collection packages (.RLP) and compute hashes for chain-of-custody.
Example quick workflow (concise)
- Create case in Redline; configure Quick Triage profile.
- Generate portable collector; run on target host.
- Import .RLP into analyst workstation.
- Identify suspicious processes, dump memory, run YARA and string searches.
- Extract suspicious files, compute hashes, and cross-reference threat intel.
- Export IOCs to detection platforms and build timeline for reporting.
Further learning and resources
- Mandiant product documentation and official tutorial materials (refer to vendor docs for the latest features and downloads).
- Memory forensics books and courses (e.g., Practical Malware Analysis, The Art of Memory Forensics) to deepen technique understanding.
- Community YARA rule repositories and threat intel feeds for up-to-date detection patterns.
This guide covers the practical usage and workflows for Mandiant Redline’s memory and malware analysis capabilities. If you want, I can: provide step‑by‑step screenshots for a sample collection, draft a checklist you can print for incident responders, or write YARA rules tailored to a specific threat family.
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